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Max Weber had described the progress of what he called "rationalization1' 
in the modern world. It calls for the "disenchantment of the world," with the 
replacement of magical thinking by reflective reason. Collective myth which 
for so long had acted as the unifying element in culture is displaced by a 
reason which compartmentalizes reality through its "will to knowledge" 
(Foucault). This compartmentalization results in what Weber designates as 
autonomous "cultural spheres of value," namely three: science-technology, art-
literature, and law-morality. The separation of the artistic sphere from its 
relation to the culturally unifying agencies of religion and centralized political 
power has resulted, through the ongoing process of rationalization, in the 
search for the "essence" of art. Jiirgen Habermas has noted that art becomes 
rationalized when, first, it becomes autonomous, second, it divests and purifies 
itself of "theoretical and moral admixtures," and third, in reflecting upon its 
own formal processes, makes those processes transparent (178). 
Each particular form of art within modernism has engaged in this 
process—literature, painting, sculpture, music, dance, theatre—and in each, the 
relentless pursuit for understanding the essence of its formal properties has 
resulted in one or another kind of minimalism. Each has reduced itself to its 
most basic form of objecthood-sound, color, plastic form, etc., but also 
drawing attention to what gives it shape-silence, emptiness, stillness. This 
movement has even resulted in certain reversals that end up encroaching on 
the territory of other arts or disciplines: conceptual art's reliance on language, 
minimal art becoming body art, then performance art, which slides into the 
theoretical purview of theater. 
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In reaction to a society in which, as Marx put it by invoking Shakespeare, 
"all that is solid melts into air," many arts in their minimalizing self-reflection 
have eschewed what is human as too ephemeral, in order to create works 
whose objecthood and survival value depends greatly upon the elimination of 
representation, of the human or anything else. Paradoxically, the nonhuman 
object becomes a refuge for the self~a materialized projection of "inner** 
creative consciousness. The desire for the objectification of self that this 
reflects emerges from the existential dread of a loss of self, inspired by the 
vertiginous positioning of the human being at the edge of the abyss of history 
and mass society. 
Since the theatre ultimately depends upon what is human, this non-
human objectifying poses something of a problem for it. The famous turn-
of-century actress Eleanora Duse was quoted by Gordon Craig as saying that 
in order to save the theatre, all the actors would have to die of the plague so 
that it could start over with a clean slate (Kirby 33). This seemed to have 
been accomplished in at least two instances of empty stage performances. One 
was an Italian Futurist performance whose "performer" was a bullet shot from 
a gun offstage. The other was Samuel Beckett's "Breath," a thirty-second 
performance consisting of the sound of an inhalation and an exhalation. But 
in both cases a human agency is made present by its absence. 
The theatre finds itself in the position of having to objectify what it is that 
can be construed as human, while trying at the same time to either radically 
reduce or eliminate the distance between the human being and its representa-
tion, or else radically increase the distance so that, as in Brecht, representation 
stands apart from the human being as a transparent process. There is on the 
spectrum of possible representation a dehumanizing limit and a humanizing 
limit. On one extreme one finds Gordon Craig's solution to be the replace-
ment of the actor with the Ubermarionette, whose nonhuman character and 
whose two virtues of "silence and obedience" provide the only adequate basis 
for a "symbol of man," since no particular actor with his eccentricities can 
really be such a symbol, with the two intentions of purity and universality. On 
the other extreme, there is Jerzy Grotowski's work, in which what is essentially 
human can only be accomplished in the full embodiment of the particular 
human being, so that, following Artaud, not only the split between representa-
tion and the human being is reduced, if not eliminated, but that the rift 
between mind and body, or as Grotowski puts it, "soul and body," is healed. 
In this process layers of personality are stripped away until one reaches an 
"inexplicable unity" (Grotowski 131). We can see that the dehumanization of 
theater and the radical humanization of theater follow a parallel course-
toward the establishment of a pure and unified object for contemplation. 
Of course the problem is that what is "essentially" human is what is not 
unified in the first place. The very nature of human consciousness is its split 
character, in which the source of consciousness can never be located, and 
therefore never objectified. As Jacques Lacan put it, "I am not wherever I am 
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the plaything of my thought; I think of what I am where I do not think to 
think" (166). But when Grotowski puts so much emphasis, in his early work, 
in impulse as a unifying force, he is not really talking about reflection but 
action, although the equally emphasized ideal of the actor's self-revelation 
already belies this. Even his reduction of theatre to its essential relationship 
of actor to spectator demonstrates in that very relationship a materialization 
of the structure of consciousness that must be split. 
If we are to draw away from Grotowski's ascetic enclave that postulates 
an essential humanity into the much larger realm of social and historical 
forces, the unified self becomes even more unfeasible, as Bertolt Brecht argues 
when he says, The continuity of the ego is a myth. A man is an atom that 
perpetually breaks up and forms anew. We have to show things as they are" 
(Brecht IS). For Brecht it is not the responsibility of the actor to objectify 
what is human as self at all. What is objectified are the relations between 
human beings, made manifest in the gestus. One should not even conceive of 
the gestus as a unified or pure act, however, in that Brecht desires as well that 
every act contain the conditions of possibility for alternative action. 
What I am primarily interested in examining is a particular form of 
objectification that takes place in modern experimental theatre whose focus is 
on the body} One can view the distinction between, to borrow terms from 
R. D. Laing, the "disembodied self and the "embodied self." Although the 
continuity of the ego may be a myth, and consciousness may be split and its 
source unlocatable, the body appears to be substantial, irreducible and solid, 
so that the focus of any theatrical search for its essential object locates itself 
there. 
Before I begin, I would like to make some brief comments on a type of 
theatre that sets itself in opposition to the phenomenological reduction of actor 
as the central feature of theatre, either as sign or body. "Total theatre" resists 
the ongoing rationalization of theatre, that is, its inexorably reductive process 
of self*reflection, in that it tries to mobilize other forces outside of its minimal 
generic boundaries: dance, music, visible spectacle, advanced technology. Yet 
what is still posited is a basis in an essential and unquestioned theatricality. 
Total theatre tries to claim hegemony over the other arts in that it puts to 
theatrical use elements from the other arts, trying to draw out the theatrical 
aspects of dance, music, visual art, etc This is reflected in Nietzsche's 
demand, after his break with Wagner, that "The theatre shall not lord it over 
the other arts" (636). Total theatre would maintain that the only synthesis can 
be a theatrical one. Yet what it is resisting is its own essentializing reduction 
by expanding its horizons in a desire for a larger cultural unity, a unity that 
defies the compartmentalization of modern life. 
Brecht recognized in this process a real lack of self-reflection, the positing 
of a cultural unity that is the promotion of a bourgeois myth. His own work 
is a meeting place of diverse arts, yet it is not a synthesis. As he puts it: "So 
let us invite all the sister arts of the drama, not in order to create an 
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'integrated work of art" in which they all offer themselves up and are lost, but 
so that together with the drama they may further the common task in different 
ways; and their relations with one another consist in this: that they lead to 
mutual alienation" (204). Brecht's aim in this is to maintain a true reflection 
of the divided and alienated nature of social and cultural spheres. 
Insofar as Brecht's theatre was operating critically at a time within 
capitalist society, his criticism of total theatre seemed justified. But if we turn 
to Russian Constructivist theatre, also operating along the lines of total theatre, 
we see that its primary function in a newly revolutionary society was a unifying, 
propagandists one, where critical self-reflection would have seemed out of 
place and counter-revolutionary. 
It is important to note that total theatre, for its synthesis to be complete, 
depends upon a certain dehumanization of the actor, for the human presence 
is too strong to allow everything to be viewed with equal attention. Recogni-
tion and identification with the human always draws us away from other 
sensory elements and relegates them to mere backdrop. Thus we see the 
incredibly stylized acting in both constructivist and Bauhaus theatre and even 
today in the performance theatre of Robert Wilson and Richard Foreman 
(despite the ruthless "ontological" self-reflection of the latter.) 
Brecht's form of schizoid acting, designed to separate in performance the 
actor from the role, is meant to draw attention to the role, its socially 
constructed nature, and not so much to the actor himself. In that the 
disembodied style of the role is to be maintained throughout, the actor must 
maintain a critical attitude toward his role, even acknowledging dislike for the 
character he plays. In effect, Brecht accepts the actor's attitude to the role 
and wants to use that to reveal the possibility of other social constructions 
through the independent decision-making ability and will of the spectator as 
"actor" in real life. Grotowski takes that back further in getting the actor to 
question his own real socially-constructed layers of personality in order to strip 
those away as well. 
What are we finally left with in the end? The body of the actor. 
Although it can be noted, as Brecht did, that the idea of the universality of 
human nature is a bourgeois illusion, when it is actually a social and historical 
construction, it can be argued that what human beings all have in common are 
bodies: this seems incontrovertible and irreducible. And our bodies feel 
pleasure and feel pain. Our common humanity as bodies operate as the first 
level of sympathy: "If you prick us do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we 
not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die?" What strikes us as so shocking 
about certain types of body art, such as that of Chris Burden, who has himself 
shot in the shoulder, or crucified to a Volkswagen, or Stelarc, who suspends 
himself by hooks piercing his flesh, is this seemingly inhuman or superhuman 
disregard for that which we hold most primally in common. The identification 
with these acts strikes too close to home and must be denied. But the denial 
of the flesh does not necessarily have to be so drastic, as a good portion of the 
FAÏJ, 1990 235 
mythos of both East and West affirms a self separate from the body. But can 
the self we "know" really be a self separate from the body? Brecht's denial 
of the "continuity of the ego" disregards the seeming continuity of the body. 
Freud connects body and ego this way: "[T]he ego is first and foremost a 
bodily ego," and in a footnote remarks, "I.e. the ego is ultimately derived from 
bodily sensations, chiefly those springing from the surface of the body1* (16). 
We construct our sense of the continuity of self on the apparent continuity of 
the body. It is, as Michel Foucault writes, "the locus of a dissociated self 
(adopting the illusion of a substantial unity)" (148). It is on this "illusion of a 
substantial unity" that the stability of the personality rests. We cannot observe 
it in the process of changing or being acted upon subtly by social forces, 
watching it continuously be "the inscribed surface of events." We are always 
surprised that we are physically not what we once were. 
In the long run Brecht's view is vindicated by Foucault. An actor taking 
on a role must observe the comportment of a particular body acted upon by 
the dynamics of a social role—the hunched shoulders of the scholar or 
accountant, the ramrod spin of a military man, etc. But what is the bodily 
comportment of the actor who is trained to take on these roles? One must 
take into account not only the body as the site of social inscription, but as the 
materialization of the individual will that resists these forces. A training of the 
body to deal with a variety of situations is a strong tradition in the theatre. 
The development of flexibility can be observed from Meyerhold's biomechanics 
and acrobatic training to the work of Grotowski. To alter the body's 
comportment is to alter one's relation to oneself. This was a factor in 
Meyerhold's reversal of Stanislavsky's working from the inside out to working 
from the outside in. As he put it, "All psychological states are determined by 
specific physiological processes" (199). 
Gordon Craig's extreme view of absolute physical control caused him to 
reject the ability of human actors in this regard in favor of the completely 
uncontrollable Ubermarionette. In this Craig never theoretically dissolved the 
split between the actor and the role inasmuch as he knew that every puppet 
needs a puppeteer, even if the wires that ran from the poet's soul were "not 
material." Still, the puppeteer remains invisible to the audience. In order for 
the actor to be an artist, "his body would have to be the slave of his mind, 
which healthy bodies refuse to do. Therefore the body of man . . . is by nature 
utterly useless as a material for art" (37). In other words, the body always at 
some level thinks for itself, disrupting the absolute physical and formal control 
of the mind. Despite this, Craig eventually abandoned the idea of replacing 
the human actor by the Ubermarionette, but instead held up the latter as an 
ideal for the former. The marionette as body, the body as exteriorized, 
disciplined ego. 
Heinrich von Kleist, a hundred years earlier, had expressed nearly the 
same criticism as Craig, in his essay "On the Puppet Theatre." He had 
observed that the real advantage of the puppet over living performers was that 
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it was "incapable of affectation." This was due to the fact that the inanimate 
puppet contained an implacable center of gravity, unlike the human being, and 
that the human attribute of affectation is created when the soul is located 
anywhere else than in "the center of gravity of a movement" (213). The 
puppet's center of gravity is in eternal homeostasis, and when the puppet is 
moved by the puppeteer, the limbs describe the inevitable lines of inertial 
force. If the actor were to follow Craig's advice, he would internalize the 
puppeteer, find his center of gravity, and move with the whole movement of 
the emotion. One must find the body's center in order to discover its limits. 
Craig traced the marionette bade to its religious origins as statue in the 
Temple. Can men create their gods, even unavoidably in their own image? 
The very impulse to escape the body drives men to create it ever anew. The 
pain of living as a body conscious of itself drives men to create bodies without 
consciousness. Lack of self-consciousness in the hieratic, noble, godlike and 
cruel ideal, to avoid sympathy, and pity that stinks of mortality. As Kleist put 
it, grace can only reappear in the theatre in "bodily form that has either no 
consciousness at all or an infinite one, which is to say, either in the puppet or 
a god" (216). 
If we are to examine the role of the body in the theatre, we should pay 
close attention to its most animate feature: the face. The face draws our 
attentions, says Sartre, because of its essential futurity: "[W]e discover among 
objects certain things we call faces. They have not, however, the same kind of 
existence as objects. Objects have no future, while the future surrounds faces 
like a muff (Natanson 162). This futurity of the face, inasmuch as it defies 
reduction to static objecthood, also reflects the movements of the mind's ability 
to transcend situations: "If we call transcendence that ability of the mind to 
pass beyond itself and all other things as well, to escape from itself that it may 
lose itself elsewhere, anywhere; then to be a visible transcendence is the 
meaning of a face" (Natanson 163). 
If we were to look at Craig s idea that desiring the human face, "the 
realest of things," to take us beyond reality is "too much to ask" (Craig 21), it 
is clear that he denies the visible transcendence that Sartre grants the human 
face. The value of the mask, or the face of the idol, the proto-Ubermarionette, 
is that it should seem to look without looking. Perpetually gazing into 
Eternity, or eternally gazing at nothing? If the mask remains the same it 
contains in itself no futurity; therefore, can it be said to indicate 
transcendence? As the face of a statue, it is "Concerned only with obedience 
to the laws of equilibrium and of motion" (Natanson 159). If, as Sartre says 
of his Mend's face, "his face is everywhere; it exists as far as his look can cany" 
(Natanson 162), then in a context of total theatre in which all parts have equal 
weight, the human face will always attract attention even while guiding it: it 
will be the center of attention and the animating force, even without language. 
The mask, in that it contains no futurity, implies no transcendence for it 
is eternally fixed; one could possibly say that it is transcendent in that it is free 
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of human vicissitudes, but in that its spirit is fixed, spectator identification is 
more difficult since it contains no possibility of transcendence. The spectator 
cannot identify himself with anything eternal or divine. The purpose of the 
mask (or the marionette) is to inspire awe, which requires a level of estrange-
ment. That estrangement depends upon the spectator's reaction to the 
ambiguous state of the mask as human in appearance yet also as an object that 
is not alive—giving it the quality of something or someone beyond life and 
death, the embodiment of a principle or perpetual attitude. Still, if this 
ambiguous state is not maintained by supplementary actions, gestures, actions 
or words, the estrangement ceases and the mask is simply reduced to the state 
of an object without effect or affect. 
It should be noted in this regard that Grotowski's desire to reveal the 
essentially human in the actor depends upon the stripping away of masks. In 
this sense the mask can be seen as a form of repression, a blockage that must 
be removed before transcendence can be achieved. What is remarkable, 
however, is that the actor is also called upon to mold his own face as a mask. 
It is a commonplace that masks actually allow more to be revealed, in that they 
protect the identity of the actor while he engages freely in activity he might 
normally not if his person was identified with that activity. In this sense, the 
mask operates as a form of dénégation, which draws attention to a certain 
reality while denying it at the same time. Of course, if Grotowski's aim is to 
demonstrate the possibility of transcendence through the stripping away of 
masks, through confessional enactment, it is necessary to begin with the mask 
as a concentration, a gestus, if you will, of that element of personality to be 
stripped away. Once the mask has been removed, we then see the actor in his 
vulnerable state. Yet this vulnerability may be yet another mask, what 
Meyerhold called the "inner mask," problematizing the endpoint of Grotowski's 
project, inasmuch as the soul of the actor has as many masks as Peer Gynt's 
onion has layers. 
Brecht attempted to defeat spectator identification with both the 
corporeal and representational being of the actor. "Spectator and actor ought 
not to approach one another but to move apart. Each ought to move away 
from himself. Otherwise the element of terror necessary to recognition is 
lacking" (26). Although Brecht is clearly using, in words like "terror" and 
"recognition," Aristotelian language, the identification of spectator with actor 
purely on the level of characterization is denied. So the terms are used in a 
very different sense. Identification with the critical method of the actor is 
implied, however, in the hope that if the actor can demonstrate his own 
objective attitude to his theatrical role, the spectator can correspondingly split 
off from himself his own social identity in the terror of recognition that this 
role is not his identity, but a socially imposed sense of self. The actor 
objectifies the role in a critical distance from himself, in the hopes that the 
spectator should follow suit. 
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To what extent can self-objectification in the consciousness of performer 
or spectator actually take place? Sartre apparently denies this processes: "One 
cannot judge oneself.. . . [My reflection] is something I can't lay hold of; it is 
not an object, but an image . . . . In other words the reflection passes into the 
state of object when it is not recognized and of image when it is" (Sartre 87). 
Here we must distinguish the possible differences between Sartre and Brecht's 
use of the word "recognition." In the first place Sartre is talking about 
recognition of one's own physical appearance, which cannot be estranged or 
objectified. So what he means by "recognize*' is acknowledgement and 
acceptance of a certain state of "things as they are." What Brecht means by it 
is the ability to recognize that things are not as they should be, that one is 
objectfying a part of one's self that, upon reflection, becomes strange and in 
contradiction to the true needs of one's self. But this alienation of object from 
self-accepting image that Brecht hopes to accomplish is a difficult task in the 
theatre, where image always becomes the dominant factor, and where even his 
own alienation effects in time become conventionalized images. Alienation of 
object from image is difficult enough to be accomplished on stage, much less 
in the passive spectator, who is more concerned with what is going to happen 
next before him, than what should be happening now inside of him. Bert 
States, in using an extreme example of observing a dog onstage, denies the 
split by saying that "in the theatre there is no ontological difference between 
the image and the object" (35). Though there may be no ontological 
difference, there will always be aphenomenological difference, as anyone who 
attends the theatre knows. Identification is never strong enough for one to 
continuously merge image and object in perceiving the actor, even in the best 
of performances. But for that split to consistently carry into the spectator's 
perception of himself outside of his role as spectator may be asking too much. 
In fact, the tension between the image and object, between the actor and 
the role, is what gives performance in the theatre its measure of power in the 
first place. But that power is also sufficient to prevent it from being carried 
to the next level of rational self-reflection. To go in the opposite direction, the 
tension between the body-as-object and the body-as-sigi gives birth to an 
awareness of presence as the tension between the basic corporeal being and the 
becoming of signification. 
"Presence" in the theatre is a physicality in the present that at the same 
time is grounded in a form of "absence." It is something that has unfolded, 
and is read against what has been seen, and presently observed in expectation 
as to what will be seen. It means that the performer is presenting himself or 
herself to the audience, but at the same time holding something back, creating 
expectation. The most frightening people are those of whom it is said "they 
are not all there." What this means is that you don't know what they are going 
to do next; you are put on edge expecting the unexpectable, at every point 
knowing that words may turn into physical actions, whether embarrassing or 
violent. In other words, not only does the notion of presence in performance 
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imply an absence, but that absence itself is the possibility of future movement, 
so paradoxically, presence is based not only in the present, but in our 
expectation of the future. If Gertrude Stein could actually achieve her ideal 
of the "continuous present" in the theater, in which no expectation existed, the 
"presence" of the performer would be lost. Even if the spectator is familiar 
with a play and knows what will come next, the "how" of what will come next 
is still missing in the present perception and the actor with presence will know 
how to keep that "how" indeterminate. 
This is not all. Presence has an inverse relationship to language. 
Presence seems to be most obvious in silence, since it resists the disembodying 
proclivities of discourse. One is holding back the articulate meaning that the 
audience is expecting. Presence of the body is stronger when linguistic 
desublimation is absent; more precisely, not absent, but not yet manifested. 
Presence becomes most acute at the moment of its possibility of dispersion 
into language, the moment of working into speech, at the edge of articulation. 
Demonstrations of uncertainty, stuttering, Artaud's cries that lapse back into 
silence, draw the audience into the space of the performer's lack of articula-
tion. Cries and stuttering draw attention not so much, or not only, to what is 
to be articulated, but to the physical origins of speech in the body of the 
performer.2 
This all might seem to place the idea of presence at only an extreme level 
of embodiment, as contrarily one can recall people who are primarily effective 
speakers fully engaged in discourse as having presence as well. But even here, 
we acknowledge their presence only when we cease to simply acknowledge the 
meaning of their words, or at least become aware of their body's relationship 
to their words. We acknowledge the physical property of the voice, we 
acknowledge the timing of their words-which draws attention to the physical 
action of the voice, and again the relation of expectation to silence. So in fact 
the words almost become supplements to the meaning displayed by the body's 
physical attitude. At times, presence is made even more acute when the body 
displays an attitude contradictory to the words, and at that point we always 
believe the truth of the body over the truth of the words-which is articulated 
in psychoanalysis as the "acting out" of a repressed subtext. 
Brecht's distrust of presence is reflected in the dependence of his work 
on discourse, for pure presence allows for no dialectical understanding. It 
erases the discursive self-consciousness of the spectator. Even Brecht's use of 
the physical gesture is designed as a supplement to discourse—its value as sign 
is more important than its physicality. In this sense, physical presence has no 
meaning in itself except that of a pure investment of one human being's 
interest (the spectator) in the performer as a human being, although within the 
theatre's tyrannical framework of representation, this requires a physical 
comportment that is "larger than life." 
The use of voice as utterer of a text is literally a "becoming-disembodied." 
Artaud's cry has a signature. It is identified with & particular body, while at the 
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same time resisting inevitable symbolic difference from the body. Spoken 
words belong to everyone. One can repeat what someone said, but try to 
repeat his cry. The distrust of text in certain post-Artaudian theatrical 
experiments was a distrust of its power to diminish the presence of the actor 
in his embodied state. Language that is uttered belongs to all, it dissipates in 
the mind, it draws the mind away from the present to possibilities, 
probabilities, dissimulations, memories, promises, etc., and it ceases to belong 
solely to the act, the event, the being before you. This "givenness" of language 
(constantly giving itself up) in other contexts obviates the notion of "an 
appropriation of discourse," for "discourse" in its very meaning contradicts the 
idea of it as a possession. As Wittgenstein said, there is no private language. 
Artaud's fear of someone stealing his words is founded on his mistaken belief 
in a unified consciousness, not accepting the fact that language is social, and 
hence based in the Other. 
But the body has also been seen in the past as a unified "body of 
knowledge." This is exemplified in the earliest forms of drama. Anagnoresis 
as the dénouement or turning point of the play, is the point of recognition 
(Oedpus recognizes his crime, Agave recognize she's killed her son Pentheus). 
Things, facts, histories are drawn together again. The hero's body is rent so 
that the body of the state can be made whole. There is another Greek word 
that, although not identical in meaning to anagnoresis, bears in its use a similar 
dynamic. Anamnesis is the Platonic basis for the revelation of knowledge, that 
is, all knowledge is known prior to bodily existence, and anamnesis is the 
process of recollection of that ideal knowledge. Socrates used the maieutic 
method to facilitate anamnesis. The maieutic method is metaphorically related 
to midwifery, birthing. Yet perhaps it is not so metaphorical after all, if all our 
knowledge is forgotten (repressed) when we are first embodied and enter this 
world. This embodiment, therefore, is also a repression of knowledge. 
Amnesia is first and foremost a physically produced state, in this case produced 
by the trauma of birth. Thus is anamnesia a /^birthing process, a ^embodi-
ment of knowledge through language. 
Brecht, a dialectician like Socrates, was engaged in a particular type of 
maieutic method. Catharsis comes after the moment of recognition. Timothy 
Wiles has shown that the term "catharsis" has varying interpretations after 
being translated from the Greek. The work of Else, Golden, and Hardison 
reads it as "clarification of incident" rather than "purgation of emotion," 
clarification preceding purgation (Wiles 126-127). Wiles has also pointed out 
that in conventional Aristotelian dramaturgy "actor and audience achieve 
catharsis at the same time during the apprehension of the play; Brecht is really 
'non-Aristotelian' in that, according to his scheme, his actor would have to 
have achieved catharsis before the play or the performance began, while his 
audience cannot experience it until after the play has ended" (82). Inasmuch 
as recognition for the actor is prior to the play and maintained throughout, 
knowledge is never embodied in the Platonic amnesiac sense. It is disembodied 
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throughout, remaining separate from the actor who "delivers" it as he 
consciously "enacts" his part. 
Finally we have to ask ourselves-the body "itself: is there such a thing? 
The thing that experiences libidinal pulsations, joy, anger, hate, lust, pain-
inasmuch as it is viewed in a certain way, can it be considered the body 
proper? Even identification with someone else's pain involves an image that 
is interpreted (grimaces, tears, cries, etc.). This entails the philosophical 
"problem of other minds." One "knows" that one has a mind, feels pain, etc., 
but how does one know this is true for others'! One answer is that we assume 
the mind and feelings of others by using ourselves as models which we then 
project on others as if they had minds and felt pain. 
Both the physical sensations that the body experiences and its incorrigible 
visibility have led certain performance and body artists to preserve the fragile 
status of the subject that has been under attack by deconstructing philosophies, 
as well as social forces, by rendering it visible as bodily object. This is roughly 
analogous to Samuel Johnson's material act of kicking the stone to refute 
Bishop Berkeley's dematerializing idealism. The avoidance by these artists of 
theatrical spaces can be seen as a way of defying the distancing and 
disembodying propensities of the relentless signifying structure of the stage, 
which as we have seen, threatens the unified notion of the self. Of course 
most of these artists emerged from the art world, and so display themselves in 
galleries and museums. Art galleries, inasmuch as they are ostensibly places 
where objects, not social selves, are on display, provide an appropriate 
structure for viewing the body as object. Other social spaces-especially if the 
artist is involved in some experientially-based interventionary practice—position 
the embodied subject in its natural habitat. Such is Vito Acconci's "Following 
Piece," where he chose random pedestrians to follow through the streets of 
New York. Or the year-long performances of Teching Hsieh-one spent living 
outdoors in New York, one spent silently in a prison cell built in his loft-
operate on a conceptual level, where the "problem of other minds" truly poses 
itself, since the performance is not based so much on the external action of the 
performer's body as it is on the performer's internal experience of the action, 
or non-action. 
A perfect example of this "non-action" is the work of the performance 
couple Marina Abramovié and Ulay. The work "Nightsea Crossing" consists 
of them sitting across a long table from each other for seven hours a day and 
at each location doing this for a week. Over the course of years they did this 
until they reached the total time of ninety days. They simply sat and stared 
into each other's eyes for the duration of the work. Not averse to having 
themselves perceived as symbols, they could be seen as the exemplification of 
duality, as male and female principles. But while one could perhaps grasp this 
signification quite easily, what is more enigmatic is their own internal 
experience as it is "displayed" to us. In this opacity we find that despite all our 
theories the body still retains an air of mystery. 
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So in the end the problem of the body in performance is a two-fold one: 
when the intention is to present the body itself as flesh, as corporeality, as 
living organism itself free of signs, it remains a sign nonetheless-at the very 
least the sign of "the body," "mortality," "sensuality." It is not enough of a pure 
corpus. When the intention is to present the performer's body as primarily a 
sign, idea, or representation, corporeality always intervenes, and it is too much 
of a body. On the one hand, it is the "problem of other minds" which posits 
the "as if of projection, but finds its identification always incomplete. On the 
other hand, it is a lack of distance, a reflection of human vicissitudes which 
makes the sign less than full for the spectator. The body can be seen, then, 
both as instrument for the sign and something inexplicably Other. 
Columbus, Ohio 
Notes 
1. What will be quickly recognized in the reading of this essay is that my concentration 
on the body as "object," an examination of its phenomenological reduction, does not take into 
account the question of gender. The omission of this question is not because I dismiss it as 
unimportant, but because I am not really prepared to discuss it here with the attention it 
deserves. There is a wealth of feminist writings on the objectification of the female body, 
especially by the "male gaze"-first addressed in film studies by Laura Murvey in her "Visual 
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" (Screen 16, No. 3, Autumn 1975), and later taken up extensively 
by film theorists such as Teresa de Lauretis, Tania Modleski and Annette Kuhn. It has been 
addressed subsequently in art (Kate Linker, Mary Kelly, Victor Burgin), photography (Abigail 
Solomon-Godeau, John Berger), and theater and performance (Sue-Ellen Case, Moira Roth, 
Elin Diamond). What I intend to show here, in a larger sense, is that the body as the signifying 
object of performance does not embody essential or universal attributes, except as those 
attributes are socially constructed. This is true for male as well as female bodies, while of 
course recognizing that how any particular objectification is taking place is what is really at stake 
within a patriarchal system, not the fact that objectification is taking place, which seems to me 
to be an undeniable aspect of cognition (or desire). 
2. This has been made even clearer to me recently in watching a performance by Karen 
Finley. Known for excessively abject, personally political, pornographic, and vitriolic monologues 
that seem to issue from a state of possession, the most unnerving moments of the performance 
are when she stops speaking. Her ranting, which is what is upsetting at first, becomes almost 
a zone of security after a while (despite its content), since one gets the sense she is not there 
to really threaten the audience. 
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Self-Possession. November 6 & 7, 1987. Milwaukee Art Museum. 
A square performance space divided into the diminishing squares of the 
Golden Section. The largest halves are labeled: the blank one is BE, the 
regressively subdivided one HAVE. The labels are to be united as BEHAVE. 
Beginning with Plato's parable of the Cave, working through Locke, Marx and 
Proudhon on the nature of personal property and the person as property, and 
ending in the all-consuming center of the Labyrinth, a voice-over commentary 
traces the journey of the body through the spaces of its habitation. Attempts 
at self-possession take many futile forms: the capture of the body's shadow and 
its mirror image; the body dancing to its own private music; rabid consumption 
of food, stimulants, sex; the pursuit of money that ends in the loss of the 
senses and the body's mobility. At the end of this chain the body confronts the 
minotaur at the center-where thought winds down in fear of its origin-it 
confronts the devourer of youth. The unravelling thread leading out eventually 
divests you of what you have in order to be. At the edge of mystic oblivion the 
body projects the scream the binds the escaping soul to the flesh, impulsively 
followed by the gasoline-fed flame that completes self-possession in annihila-
tion. 
Finally, even when the lights come on, in the direct address that follows 
each play, the body is faced with its inescapable reduction to the status of a 
sign in the eyes of the audience. The body extends its hand to cover those 
eyes, passing from watching body to watching body. What they had, what the 
body had, in the course of performance is gone as quickly as it materializes, 
and its memory cannot be held. Departing, the body kicks apart the sign, and 
BEHAVE loses fcs properties» its hold on bciag. 
In the act of possession the possession dies. 
Every time I turn to face my shadow, he turns away from me. 
I reside in the limbo of appearance. 
You render me fleshless. 
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From Self-Possession. Written and performed by Jon Erickson. Performance photo by Jim 
Brozek. 
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Assorted "Speechworks," from The Clearinghouse of Being, by Jon Erickson 
resource resource resource resource resource 
resource resource resource resource resource resource 
resource resource resource resourceresourceresourceresource 
resourceresourceresourceresourceresourceresorceresorceresorce 
resorceresorcerysorcerysorcerysorcerysorcerysorcerysorcery 
sorcerysorcerysorcerysorcery sorcery sorcery sorcery sorcery 
sorcery sorcery sorcery sorcery sorcery sorcery sorcery 
sorcery sorcery sorcery sorcery sorcery sorcery sorcery 
sorcery sorcery sorcery sorcery sorcery 
pray pray pray pray pray pray pray 
pray pray pray pray pray pray pray pray pray pray 
pray pray pray pray pray pray praypraypraypraypraypraypray 
prayprayprayprayprayprayprayperaperaperaperaperaperaperape 
raperaperape rape rape rape rape rape rape rape rape rape 
rape rape rape rape rape rape rape rape rape rape 
rape rape rape rape rape rape rape 
I will I will I will I will I will I will I will 
I will I will I will I will I will I will I will I will I will 
ïwilllwilllwilllwilllwilllwilllwilllwillliewillliewillliewilllie 
will lie will lie will lie will lie will lie will lie will lie 
will lie will lie will lie will lie will lie 
so are you so are you so are you so are you so are you 
so are you so are you so are you so are you so are you 
sour you sour you sour you sour you sour you sour you 
sour use sour use sour use sour use sour use sour use 
our use our use our use our use our use our use our use 
our use our use our use our use our use our use 
I want it I want it I want it I want it I want it 
I want it I want it I want it I want it I want it I want it 
I wannit I wannit I wannit I wannitlwannnitlwannitlwannitlwannit 
IwannitlwannitlwannitlwannitlwannitlwannitlwannitlwannitlwannitI 
wannitlwannitlwannadiewannadiewannadiewannadiewannadiewannadie 
wanna die wanna die wanna die wanna die wanna die wanna die 
wanna die wanna die wanna die wanna die wanna die 
wanna die wanna die wanna die wanna die 
